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Alternative Rebate Rules in the Provision of a Threshold Public Good: 
An Experimental Investigation 
I. Introduction 
In 1995 the Niagara Mohawk Power Company ofNew York introduced the Green Choice 
program. Citizens in upstate New York could opt to join the program through a commitment to 
pay an additional fixed fee each month that would be added to their electric bill. Fees would be 
collected for a twelve month period and, if enough were collected, would be used to build an 
environmentally friendly energy project. Since this energy project had an associated price tag, a 
certain minimum number of subscnoers to the Green Choice Program were required. If 
subscriptions fell short of the needed level, the program would be abandoned and the funds 
previously collected, returned. The Green Choice program is an example of a simplified provision 
point mechanism designed to fund a threshold public good.1 
In a provision point mechanism, the size of a proposed project and the associated total 
cost are predetermined (this cost threshold is referred to in the literature and in this paper as the 
provision point). Members of the community impacted by the project submit bids stating their 
dollar commitment to covering the project costs. If the sum of contributions covers the cost of 
the project, it is funded, otherwise it is not.2 
Because individuals receive benefits upon meeting or exceeding the contribution 
threshold, the provision point mechanism lends itself to potential over contribution. For example, 
Niagara Mohawk might find that they collect more than the necessary funds to build the 
renewable energy project. 3 Therefore, the rules of the mechanism must specify the distribution of 
1We thank WJ.!J.iam Schulze for bringing the Niagara Mohawk Green Choice Project to our attention. For more 
delails on this program see Schulze ( 1995). 
2The provision point mechanism itself specifies neithex a refund nor a rebate mechanism. The refund mechanism 
describes how money collected is refunded when the provision point is not met. l.n this study w-e use a money back 
guarantee procedure. If the provision point is not met, all contributions are returned to their contributors. l.n 
contr:lSt, the .rebate procedure descnbes how money collected over and above the provision point is rebated to 
contributq~. 
, .. 
3This problem of collecting too many funds was r-ecently threatening the city of Seattle, where lottery tickets 
marketed to finance a new stadium for the Seattle Mariners w-ere selling v•ell above expecwion. The lottery was 
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any such excess contributions. It is this institutional feature, which we wiU refer to as "rebate 
rules," that is explored in this paper4 
This study repons the results of an experiment involving the voluntary provision of 
threshold public goods. We examine three principal rebate approaches. 
The first and simplest is a No Rebate policy in which excess contributions are simply 
wasted. This wastage can be interpreted literally, as throwing the extra funds into the ocean, or 
figuratively, when those funds are spent on goods which provide no utility to the contributors. 
For example, Niagara Mohawk might choose to use excess contributions for decorating the 
offices of their employees. Since the money is essentially lost from the perspective of the 
contributors, the No Rebate policy involves the strictest penalties for over contribution. 
The second rebate rule is a Proponional Rebate policy, in which excess contributions are 
distributed back to contributors in proportion to their individual contributions. This rule involves 
weaker penalties for over contribution than does the No Rebate policy, and the penalty varies with 
the amount contributed by each individual and by the group. 
The third rebate rule is the Utilization Rebate rule in which excess contributions are used 
to provide more of the public good in a continuous manner. For example, Niagara Mohawk 
could use excess contributions to plant trees.~ While the Utilization rebate policy involves some 
penalties for over contribution, they are not nearly as harsh as the No Rebate policy and are 
generally smaller than the penalties from the Proportional Rebate policy. 
obligated to contribute $3 million toward the cost of the stadium. but in the fust eight days of sales, the tickets had 
raised $582,000. If all the year's tickets were sold, the lottery would bring in $3.9 million. The rebate mccllanism. 
would describe how the e.=s $900,000 would be spent. The Associated Press reports that "(t)he surplus will be 
paid into the swe's general fund. . .".quoted from ClariNet (1996). 
4It is important to distinguish between the instinuional feature that we refer to as rebates and the feature of 
refunds. Refund rules apply when the contribution level is less than the threshold amount and the project is not 
provided. Rebate rules apply when the contnbution level e:rceeds the requited threshold and the project is 
provided. Excess funds can be rebated back to contnbutors according to some prespecified rule. 
~In fact, the current version of the Green Choice Program im·olves a very similar provision. 
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With the parameter values we choose, and under all three rebate policies, the provision 
point mechanism game has a continuum of Nash equilibria in which the provision point is exactly 
met. Each equilibrium in the continuum specifies how the costs of providing the public good are 
divided among the contributors. 
The rebate feature seems to be an important part of a public goods provision point 
mechanism. However, theoretical discussion of rebates in the literature is sparse. The idea of 
rebates is first discussed in Smith (1980) who presents an experiment using two rebate options in 
the investigation of an auction mechanism for public goods provision. Unfortunately, he does not 
report differences between the alternate rebate mechanism. Bagnoli and Lipman ( 1989) suggest 
that rebate policies should have the property that an increase in contribution of$1 by individual i 
should not generate a refund to individual i of more than $1. All three policies we examine have 
this property. 
This paper offers three important contributions. First, it explores an institutional feature 
of voluntary public goods provision, the rebate feature, which has not yet been investigated. 
Knowledge of the importance of this feature will aid economists in furthering their understanding 
of public goods mechanisms and policy makers in selecting policy implementations. Second, it 
offers further experimental evidence of the usefulness of the provision point mechanism for 
providing public goods, an area where experimental study is very limited. And third, the results of 
this study help to explain discrepancies between the two existing provision point mechanism 
studies, Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991). 
These two studies make up the bulk of experimental work in provision point mechanisms 
and involve strikingly different results. Bagnoli and McKee report subjects playing the efficient 
Nash equilibrium (in which the provision point is exactly met) 54% of the time. In Isaac, et al. 's 
medium provision-point sessions (the ones most comparable with Bagnoli and McKee and this 
study) only 3% of the observations are Nash equilibria. There are many procedural differences 
between the two studies; group sizes, average net earnings from the public good, framing of the 
3 
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instructions and informational environments. However, the results from this paper argue that the 
driving difference between the frequency of equilibria play observed in the two papers is the use 
of rebate mechanism. Bagnoli and McKee use a no-rebate policy while Isaac, et a/. use a 
utilization rebate policy. In this study, the no-rebate policy had significantly higher equilibrium 
play than the utilization rebate did. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the game and various 
rebate mechanisms. Section 3 describes the experimental parameters and proced1,1res. Section 4 
outlines some conjectures while Section 5 presents the experimental results and analysis. Section 
6 concludes. 
2. The Game and Rebate Mechanisms 
Imagine a group of size N, in which each individual has an endoWment E;, and a valuation 
for a threshold public good v1• Individuals allocate some portion of their endowment toward 
funding the public good, u,. The cost of providing the public good is PP. If Eu, ~ PP then the 
public good is provided. If not, the public good is not provided and all contributions are returned. 
Individual payoffs in this game differ with the different rebate policies. The individual 
payoff functions ( -r J and associated marginal costs of over contribution for the three policies are 
derived below. 
A. No Rebate Policy 
T; = (E1 - UJ + V1 
-r; = E, otherwise 
Under the no rebate policy, any surplus allocated to the public good disappears. Thus if 
the public good is provided (with or without excess funds), each player receives the payoff from 
their private consumption, and their value (v;) for the public good. If the public good is not 
provided, contributions are returned and players receive payoff from their private consumption 
4 
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only. The penalty associated with over contribution imposed on individual i is calculated by the 
panial derivative 
implying that the additional unit of endowment contributed to the public good beyond the 
provision point level (PP) by individual i is wasted. It may help to think of making excess 
contributions in the No Rebate treatment as a negative-sum activity; no player receives any benefit 
from the excess contributions, and the player who made them is worse off. 
B. Proportional Rebate Policy 





Under this rebate policy if the public good is provided, players receive payoff from their 
private consumption of their remaining endowment as well as their value for the public good. In 
addition, they receive a share of any excess contributions for private consumption. Their share is 
set equal to the proportion of their contribution to the public good. If the public good is not 
provided, players again receive payoff from privately consuming their endowment. 
where 
The penalty associated with over contnoution is 
= -1 + 
(t 11J -PP(E111 -11 1) 
(!:11;)' 
0 < (!:111)' -PP{!:111 -111) 
- (!:11;}' ~1 
5 
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The penalty for over contribution under the proportional rebate policy changes over the 
range of individual and group contributions.6 It may help to think of making excess contributions 
in the Proportional Rebate treatment as a constant-sum activity; excess contributions can be 
characterized as transfers from the player who made them to the other players in his group. 
C. Utilization Rebate Policy 
Under the utilization rebate policy, contributions generated over and above those 
necessary for provision of the public good are used to provide more of a similar but continuous 
public good. In the Green Choice Program, for example, funds raised in excess of those needed 
to construct the project could be used to plant trees. One more parameter is needed to describe 
the utilization rebate policy; the marginal value to the individual of this continuous public good. 
Call that value w,. Now we can describe 
..-, = (E,- o) + v, + w,(I:u, - PP) 
otherwise 
If the public good is provided each player receives in addition to the payoff from their 
private consumption and their value for the public good, their value from the utilization rebate 
(zero when the provision point is exactly reached and I:u, = PP, positive otherwise). 
The penalty associated with over contribution is calculated by the same derivative, but 
now has the form 
a 'I(, 
.=.::1. = -1 + W· 
aoi I 
implying that while a marginal unit of endowment allocated to the public good over the level of 
PP is not wasted, it nonetheless would be better spent in private consumption whenever w, < 1. 
6Under this rebate me.:hanism, an extra token contributed by player i is not wasted (as in the No Rebate treatment) 
but instead redistributed among all the players in proportion to their contneutions. Although an individual's 
payoff from his contribution of an extta token is negative, the other players in his group receive positive payoff 
from his over contribution. To see this we only need note that 
aT, = PPa, 2:0 (= 0 only when PP = 0 or a,= 0) 
aa; ra, 
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This condition is exactly the one discussed in Bagnoli and Lipman; that an increase in contribution 
of one unit by individual i should not generate a refund to individual i of more than one unit. 
Under this rebate treatment, if W; ~ 1 and Ew; ~ 1, over contribution can be viewed as 
voluntary contribution to a continuous public good. Making excess contributions in the 
Utilization Rebate treatment under this parameterization is a positive-sum activity; excess 
contributions do make the group as a whole better off; albeit at the expense of the contributor. 
D. Equilibria of the Game 
The set ofNash equilibria in this game are the same under any of the three rebate policies. 
In each game there exists a continuum of efficient Nash equilibria in which the players contribute 
exactly enough to achieve the provision point and provide the public good (Eu; = PP). These 
equilibria have the same group contribution level, and are not pareto-rankable. They are distinct 
from one another only in the cost-sharing rule used to divide the costs of the public good among 
the participants. 
In addition, there are a continuum of pareto-dominated equilibria ofthis stage game in 
which the provision point is not met and the public good is not provided, characterized in the next 
section. These equilibria were observed in only two instances out of300. 
3. Experimental Parameters and Procedures 
All sessions of the experiment were performed in a non-computerized laboratory at Texas 
A&M University. Each of the three rebate policy treatments involved four experimental sessions 
of one group of five subjects (N=5). Each session involved subjects playing the public goods 
game repeatedly for 25 periods. 
In each period, all individuals were endowed with 55 tokens (E; = 55). Subjects were 
asked to divide their endowment between two types of accounts: a Private Account and a Group 
Account. The group account parallels contributing toward providing the public good {their 
contribution to the group account is u) . The private account parallels private consumption. For 
7 
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each token allocated to their private account, a subject received 1¢ per token. Tokens allocated 
to the group account were totaled and compared with the provision point of 125 tokens 
(PP=l25). 
Each subject's value for the public good was v, = 50¢. Thus each subject received 50¢ if 
the provision point was reached by the group. If it was not reached, each subject received their 
contribution ( u;) back. These tokens were assumed to be invested in the private account and 
earned 1 ¢ per token. 
In the event of a surplus of tokens in the group account, the rebate feature specifies their 
distnbution. The marginal value for the continuous public good in the utilization rebate treatment 
was w,=21N; thus in that treatment each individual received .4¢ for each token allocated to the 
group account above and beyond 125. Notice that w, < I and Ew, ~ I, as discussed above.7 
With these parameter values we can calculate the marginal penalties from over 
contnbution in each of the three treatments. As before, in the No Rebate treatment the cost to an 
individual of over contribution by one token is 
In the Proportional Rebate treatment that cost is 
011'; 
= -1 + 
(I:u1) 2 - 12s(I:u, -u.) 
(EuY 
where this cost is bounded berween 0 and I and depends on any given subject's contn1mtion to 
the group account as a proportion of the total amount contributed. Finally, in the Utilization 
Rebate treatment the cost of over contribution by one token is 
011'. 
_ , =-1 + .4 = -.6. 
OCT; 
7This value for w1 is consistent \\ith the ratio of the value to the cost of the threshold public good. The cost of the 
public good is 125 tokens while the return from it is 250 tokens di\ided equally among the participants. 
•8 
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Under a very broad range of contribution distributions, the penalty from over contribution 
in the Proportional Rebate treatment falls between those in the No Rebate and Utilization Rebate 
treatments (between -1 and -.6). Of the 500 individual decisions made in the Proportional Rebate 
treatment of this experiment, the penalty fell outside this range only 15 times (3%).8 
All experimental instructions were written so that they conform to language developed by 
Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984). All language referring to "investments" or "contributions" 
was intentionally avoided and replaced by words such as "allocation" of tokens. Common 
information was established by reading instructions out loud and using an overhead projector. 
After each decision period the total Group Account allocation was announced verbally and 
was displayed on an overhead. Subjects played the public goods game with one rebate treatment 
for 25 periods. 
The set of efficient equilibria of the stage game involve each group of five subjects 
allocating exactly 125 tokens to the group account. Additionally, this stage game has a unique 
symmetric efficient equilibrium in which each of the five members of the group allocates 25 
tokens to the group account. Previous research suggests that this equilibria may serve as a focal 
point, see Schelling (1960), and the frequency of its occurrence will be analyzed below. 
The stage game also has a continuum of inefficient equilibria, in which the public good is 
not provided. Out of 300 group decisions, only two instances of these inefficient equilibria were 
observed.9 
8Funhermore, those 15 decisions are all attributable to three subjects who <Xlnsistently contributed more to the 
public good than their valuation for it. 
~ere are a number of pareto-dominated equilibria in which somewhere between 0 and 86 tokens are allocated to 
the group account, but no player can unilaterally supplement the account to achieve the provision point. Thus all 
tokens are returned to the players who are then indifferent between any allocation. A1l example of this equilibria is 
a vector of allocations to the group account like (16,16,16,16,16) (an asymmetric example is (6,14,19,20,21)). 
Here 80 tokens have been allocated, but no one player has the necessary 45 tokens to unilaterally supplement the 
group account to achieve 125. No equilibrium of this son exists in which 87 - 124 tokens are contributed, and only 
two instances of this equilibrium were observed out of the 300 group decisions. 
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4. Hypotheses and Informal Conjectures 
A. Group Contributions 
The set of Nash equilibria in the public goods game under each of these three rebate 
mechanisms are the same. While the efficient Nash equilibria predictions do not generate a unique 
cost sharing rule, they do generate a unique aggregate contribution level. The first conjecture 
outlined in this subsection involves whether any element of this set of equilibria is played. 
Conjecture I (NE): Groups in all treatments v.ill play an efficient Nash equilibrium, thus 
the aggregate level of contributions will equal the provision point level of contnoutions 
(PP= 125) in all three rebate treatments. 
Although Conjecture I describes the set of Nash equilibria of the game, groups may find it 
difficult to coordinate on a particular equilibrium out of the set. If this coordination failure is 
prevalent we might expect Conjecture 1 to be invalidated. However, economic theory makes few 
predictions of what will occur in place of equilibrium behavior. 
A second conjecture addresses these predictions and competes with Conjecture I. It 
suggests that the magnitude of the penalty associated with over contribution affects the behavior 
of groups, thus contributions should be greater when the penalty is lower. For our three 
treatments, then, we have 
Conjecture 2: Groups in the Utilization Rebate treatment will have higher levels of 
contributions than groups in the Proportional Rebate treatment, who will have similarly 
higher contributions than groups in the No Rebate treatment. 
Another informal conjecture suggests that the frequency of equihoria we observe will 
depend on the penalties for deviating from those equilibria. Since the No Rebate policy creates 
the largest penalty for over contribution, we might expect subjects in this treatment to focus the 
10 
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most on the efficient Nash equilibrium contribution level. The Utilization Rebate policy with the 
smallest penalty for over contribution should generate the weakest focus on the efficient Nash 
equilibrium contribution level. Conjecture 3 captures this notion that as the penalty from over 
contribution rises, so does the proponion of equilibria played. 
Conjecture 3: Groups in the No Rebate treatment are more likely to play an efficient Nash 
equilibrium than groups in the Proponional Rebate treatment. Groups in the Proponional 
Rebate treatment are more likely to play an efficient Nash equilibrium than groups in the 
Utilization Rebate treatment. 
B. Individual Contributions 
Although the provision point game examined here has a continuum of Nash equilibria, it 
also has a unique symmetric equilibrium in which each of the five members of the group allocates 
25 tokens to the group account. This equilibrium may serve as a focal point for the players, 
especially in treatments with higher penalties for miscoordination. The No Rebate treatment has 
the highest penalty, and the Utilization Rebate treatment the lowest. Thus we would expect a 
higher proponion of players playing their part of the unique symmetric efficient Nash equilibrium 
in the No Rebate treatment, and a lower proponion in the Utilization Rebate treatment. This 
intuition is captured in Conjecture 4 
Conjecture 4: The proponion of players playing their part of the unique symmetric 
efficient Nash equilibrium v.ill be higher in the No Rebate treatment than in the 
Proponional Rebate treatment and similarly higher in the Proponional Rebate treatment 
than in the Utilization Rebate treatment. 
C. Convergence 
Finally, we can look at group data over time. Although economic theory suggests subjects 
will play the Nash equilibrium, in practice such equilibria are not as much played as they are 
11 
arrived at or converged toward. In this experiment the stage game was repeated 25 times. We 
might think that subjects use this repetition to coordinate on a particular efficient Nash 
equilibrium. 
Conjecture 5: Group contributions approach the Nash equilibrium outcome of 125 tokens 
in all three treatments. 
The next section presents the results of the experiment and addresses Conjectures 1 
through 5. 
5. Results and Analysis 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the total contributions for each period in each session by 
treatment. 
Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here 
A. Group ConTributions 
This subsection provides analysis of group contributions to the public good. Table 1 
displays summary statistics for group contribution levels of the three treatments. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Clearly, groups do not always arrive at a Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, the Nash 
equilibrium prediction does a good job of organizing the data in the Proportional and No Rebate 
treatments. To show this we run a random effects model using GLS.1o The dependent variable 
10orbe random effects model corrects for covariance in the error term caused by multiple observations from a single 
group of subjects. Unless reponed otherwise, regressions use two-factor random effects models. The first factor is 
the group to which the observation belongs. the second factor is the period in which the outcome ·was observed. 
Comparisons are thus between treatments controlling for changes in beha\-ior aver time. 
12 
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was total group contributions, and the independent variables were dununies for the treatments 
(NR =regression constant, PR and UR). The regression output is presented in Table 2. 
Insen Table 2 about here 
We can use these results to test the hypothesis that average contributions in each of the 
three treatments equal125. That hypothesis cannot be rejected for either the Proportional or No 
Rebate treatments (F(1,9) = 0 .00, Prob > F = .9314; F(1,9) = .10, Prob > F = .7617 respectively). 
However, it can be rejected for the Utilization Rebate treatment (F(1,9) = 60.98, Prob > F = 
.0000).11 Support for Conjecture 1 (that groups play Nash equilibrium) is mixed. Clearly it is not 
the case that in each round of the game subjects coordinate on a Nash equilibrium. But in the 
Proportional and No Rebate treatments, average contributions are not statistically distinguishable 
from the Nash equilibrium prediction. These results are summarized in Observation 1. 
Observation I: Average contributions in the Proportional and No Rebate treatments are 
not statistically distinguishable from the Nash equilibrium contributions of 125 tokens. 
However, contributions in the Utilization Rebate treatment are significantly higher than the 
equilibrium contribution of 125 tokens (mixed support for Conjecture!). 
The results from the regression reported in Table 2 can also be used to test the competing 
Conjecture 2, that higher contn'butions will be observed in treatments with lower penalties for 
over contribution. That conjecture cannot be supported for the comparison between the 
Proportional and No Rebate treatments, where contributions are not distinguishable from one 
11Two other statistical tests of these hypotheses lead to the same conclusion. Both involve finding each group's 
average contribution over 25 periods. Thus each treatment is summarized into four independent observations. At-
ll:St -Mth three degrees of freedom on these four observations fu.i.ls to reject the hypotheses that average 
contributions = 125 in the Proportional and No Rebate treatments (t; -.10, Pr > ltl; .9277; t = -2.07, Pr >It!= 
. 1305 respectively). However, we can reject the hypothesis that average contributions= 125 in the Utilization 
Rebate treatment (t; 5.30, Pr >It! = .0131). Using the same four observations per treatment, a Wllcoxon signed-
rank test produces qualitatively similar results. 
13 
another (the PR coefficient is not significantly different from zero). However, contributions in the 
Utilization Rebate treatment are significantly higher than those in the other two conditions. For 
comparison with the No Rebate treatment it is enough to observe that the UR coefficient is 
significantly different from zero. A separate comparison with the Proportional Rebate treatment 
suggests significant difference as weU (F(l,9) = 31.19, Prob > F = .0003).12 This mixed support is 
summarized in Observation 2. 
Observation 2: Average contributions in the Proportional and No Rebate treatments are 
not statisticaUy distinguishable from each other. However, average contnoutions in the 
Utilization Rebate treatment are significantly higher than in either of the other two (mixed 
support for Conjecture 2). 
One particularly salient feature of the data are the different variances of contributions in 
the three treatments. Two sorts of variance are of interest in this analysis. The first is the extent 
to which groups within a treatment differ from each other. Figures 1-3 suggest that the four 
groups in the Utilization Rebate treatment differ more from each other than the four groups in the 
No Rebate treatment in any given period. Another random effects model using GLS is run to test 
the significance of this sort of variance. 
The dependent variable is constructed to capture the spread of the groups. For each 
treatment in each period, we calculate the average contribution of the four groups. Each group's 
squared distance from this average is then calculated and used as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables were the same dummies from the previous regression (NR = regression 
constant, PR and UR). Regression output is presented in Table 3. 
12Jf each group's contributions are averaged over time, producing four independent observations per treatment, a 
two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test cannot distinguish between contnbutions in the Proportional and No Rebate 
treatments (U = 6, p = .686). However, the same test rejects the null hypothesis of similarity between the 
Utilization and Proportional Rebate treatments (U = 0, p = .028) and between the Utilization and No Rebate 
t=tments (UG 0, p = .028). 
14 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
These results support the hypothesis that the variances in the three treatments are ordered 
by the penalty for over contribution. The No Rebate treatment clearly has the least variance of 
the three treatments. The Proportional Rebate dummy is (almost) significantly different from zero 
at the 5% !eve~ suggesting that the variance in that treatment is higher than the variance in the No 
Rebate treatment. The Utilization Rebate dummy is significantly different from zero, and a 
comparison of the Proportional and Utilization Rebate coefficients suggest the variances in those 
two treatments differ as well (F(l,9) = 40.99, Prob > F = .0001). 
The second sort of variance which may be of interest is the variance of a group's 
contributions over time. For each group in each treatment we calculate the variance of their 
contributions over 25 periods. With four independent data points in each treatment, a Mann-
Whitney U test provides pairwise comparisons. Given the previous results, a one-tailed test was 
used. Groups move more in the Proportional than in the No Rebate treatments (U = 2, p = .057), 
and more in the Utilization than in the Proportional Rebate treatments (U = 0, p = .014). 
Both these measures of variance suggest Observation 3. 
Observation 3: As the penalty for over contribution drops through the three treatments, 
the variance in contribution level rises. 
This result was not hypothesized, but is consistent with some post-hoc analysis of adaptive 
learning theories.13 We reserve a full discussion of learning theories in this game to another 
paper. 
13The inruition here rests on the negatively-sloped best response function. If others in your group are high 
contributors your best response is to contribute low. In treatments where the penalty for over contribution is low 
Qike the Utilization Rebate treatment), individuals have an incentive to contribute high. The natural response in 
later rounds is to contribute very few tokens, leading to wide mings in contnOution behavior. For example, 
simulations run using the Roth and Erev (1995) adaptive learning model on these three payoff functions involve 
si.milarly-<>rdered variances in the three treatments, under a variety of parameter values (parameter values and 
details of !he adaptive learning model can be found in Erev and Rolh (1995)). 
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B. Proportions of Success and Nash Equilibria 
This subsection provides an analysis of the frequencies of successful provisions of the 
public good and Nash equilibria played in each of the three treatments. The provision point is met 
and the public good funded slightly more than half the time in all three treatments. These 
proportions of successful provision are not significantly different from each other. To show this 
we calculate the proportions of successful provisions of each group over 25 periods. A two-tailed 
Mann-Whitney U test compares the four independent data points in each treatment, and finds no 
significant differences between any pairwise comparison (NR vs PR: U = 6.5, p = .786; PR vs 
UR: u = 5, p = .468; NR VS UR: u = 6.5, p = .786). 
Observation 4: Although subjects achieve the provision point only slightly more than half 
the time, the frequency with which the public good is provided does not vary with the 
rebate mechanism. 
However, the proportion of equilibrium outcomes observed (that is, the proportion of 
times the public good is exactly provided) does differ between the treatments. That proportion is 
significantly higher in the No Rebate treatment than in either of the other two. A similar 
construction as described above provides four independent observations per treatment of the 
proportion of times the public good is exactly funded. The same two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test 
finds an almost significant difference between those proportions in the Proportional and No 
Rebate treatment (U = I, p = . 058) and a significant difference between the Utilization and No 
Rebate treatment (U = 0, p = .028). No difference is found between the proportions of Nash 
equilibria played between the Proportional and Utilization Rebate treatments (U = 5.5, p = .586). 
This result provides partial support for Conjecture 3, which suggested that treatments with higher 
penalties for over contribution -will have a higher incidence of Nash equilibrium play. 
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Observation 5: The proportion of equilibrium outcomes are significantly higher in the No 
Rebate treatment than in either of the other two (mixed support for Conjecture 3). 
This observation also addresses the differences between previous experimental results of 
Bagnoli and McKee and Isaac, eta/. Bagnoli and McKee used a no-rebate structure in their 
experiment and find strong support for the Nash equilibrium (for group sizes of five, 54% of their 
observations are Nash equilibria). In contrast, Isaac eta/. use a utilization rebate structure, and 
find only 3% Nash equilibrium play in their medium threshold treatment. 
C. Summary of Group Data 
Using data at the group level there are a number of important conclusions we can draw. 
Contributions are significantly higher under the Utilization Rebate rule than under either of the 
other two rules (mixed support for Conjecture 2). The variance of contributions is significantly 
different under all three rules; highest in the Utilization Rebate treatment (with the lowest 
penalties for over contribution) and lowest in the No Rebate treatment (with the highest 
penalties). Subjects clearly do not play a Nash equilibrium in each round of the three treatments, 
but on average group contributions cannot be distinguished from Nash equilibrium play in either 
the No Rebate or Proportional Rebate treatments (mixed support for Conjecture I). Although 
there are no differences in the proportion of successes between the three treatments, we observe 
significantly more Nash equilibrium play in the No Rebate treatment than in the other two 
(Conjecture 3). This result is consistent with the high levels of equilibrium play observed by 
Bagnoli and McKee (who used no rebates) and the low levels observed by Isaac eta/. (who used 
a utilization rebate). 
D. Individual Contribution Data 
The discussion above refers to total group contribution levels in each period and does not 
address how contributions are distributed among group members. Conjecture 4 suggests that 
individual contributions will be differentially consistent with a symmetric cost-sharing rule in 
17 
. . .. ··· ·· . .. . .... . 
different treatments. The symmetric equilibrium can be described as exhibiting the property of 
fairness if individuals focus on ability or willingness to pay as a criteria. Given that endowments 
and valuations are homogeneous, and that this is common infonnation, the symmetric cost-sharing 
rule is transparent and provides a potentially strong focal point. Under a symmetric cost-sharing 
rule, each of the five individuals contributes 25 tokens; an equal share of the cost threshold. 
The overall proportions of symmetric equilibrium contributions in the No Rebate 
treatment is .508, in the Proportional Rebate treatment is .284 and in the Utilization Rebate 
treatment is .074. To show the statistical differences between these proportions, we calculate for 
each individual in the experiment the proportion of times they played their part of the symmetric 
equilibrium. With 20 observations in each treatment (one for each individual) we use a one-tailed 
Mann-Whitney U test to test Conjecture 4. The proportion of individuals playing the synunetric 
equilibrium strategy is significantly lower in the Proportional than in the No Rebate treatment (U 
= 127, p ::; .025) and that proportion is significantly lower in the Utilization than in the 
Proportional Rebate treatment (U = 132, p ::; .05). 
Observation 6: The proportion of subjects playing their part of the symmetric equilibrium 
is highest in the No Rebate treatment and lowest in the Utilization Rebate treatment, with 
the Proportional Rebate treatment falling in between (support for Conjecture 4). 
This observation provides strong support for Conjecture 4, which completely ordered the three 
treatments as to the proportion of individual Nash equilibrium play expected as a function of the 
penalty from over contribution in each treatment. 
E. CoTTVergence 
Finally, we examine whether groups converged toward an efficient Nash equilibrium 
during the experimental session (Conjecture 5). First we calculate the squared distance between 
the group contribution and the equilibrium outcome of 125 tokens in each period for each group. 
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Diffl25 becomes the dependent variable in three one-way random effects GLS regressions (one 
for each treatment). Independent variables are period and period squared. Table 4 presents the 
results of these regressions. H 
Insert Table 4 about here 
If groups are converging toward 125 tokens we should observe a significant and negative 
effect of period on squared deviation from equilibrium outcomes. A significant coefficient (of any 
sign) on period squared suggests that the convergence is nonlinear. In all three treatments, both 
these coefficients are significantly different than zero. The negative coefficients on period suggest 
groups converge toward the group contribution of 125 over the course of the game. The positive 
coefficients on period squared suggests the convergence slows over the course of the game. This 
result supports Conjecrure 5. 
Observation 7: In all three treatments, groups converge toward 125 (support for 
Conjecture 5). 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This research explores the rebate fearure of voluntary public goods provision. The 
investigation concludes that selection of the rebate policy has a significant impact on the 
frequency of equilibrium play, individual behavior and total contribution levels. 
We find contributions to be significantly higher when excess contributions are utilized 
(Utilization Rebate treatment) than when they are rebated to contributors proportionally 
(Proportional Rebate treatment) or wasted (No Rebate treatment) (Observation 2). In the latter 
two treatments average contribution levels cannot be distinguished from the Nash equilibrium 
contribution level, while contributions are significantly higher than Nash levels in the Utilization 
1
"Ciearly when describing behavior over time, period number cannot be used in a random effectS model. These 
regressions only provide random effectS for groups, not for period number. 
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Rebate treatment (Observation 1). Even though average contributions in the Utilization Rebate 
treatment are higher, the proportion of times the public good is actually funded is not significantly 
different between the three treatments (Observation 4). 
This result is driven by the significantly different variances between the three rebate 
mechanisms, highest when the penalty for over contribution is lowest in Utilization Rebate, and 
lowest when the penalty for over contribution is highest in No Rebate (Observation 3). These 
variances reflect the underlying penalties from over contribution in each of the three treatments. 
The proportion of equilibria played was significantly higher in the No Rebate treatment 
than in either of the other two treatments (Observation 5). This result helps organize the 
conflicting experimental results ofBagnoli and McKee (who observed 54% Nash equilibrium play 
under a No Rebate rule) and Isaac eta/. (who observed 3% Nash equilibrium play under a 
Utilization Rebate rule). Finally, contributions converge toward the Nash equilibrium outcome in 
all three treatments (Observation 7). 
The results of this experiment suggest that rebate features do not influence the proportion 
of successful provisions of threshold public goods. However, if the objective is to maximize 
contribution levels, a Utilization Rebate mechanism can be more productive. On the other hand, if 
the objective is to minimize the variance of contributions or increase the frequency of equitable 
cost-sharing, a No Rebate procedure is preferable. 
These results provide information on the importance of the rebate feature. We hope it will 
aid economists in furthering their understanding of decentralized public goods mechanisms, as 
well as help policy makers in selecting policy implementations of provision point mechanisms. 
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No 
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Mean Contributions 124.47 













Two-Factor Random Effects GLS Regression (Contributions) 
Number of observations 300 
n = number of groups 12 
T= number of periods 25 
R-squared overall = 0. 1298 
GroupCont Coefficient Std. Err. t P>ltl 
PR 0.3799992 2.397729 0.158 0.878 
UR 13.77 2.397729 5.743 0.000 
constant 124.47 1.69545 73.414 0.000 
. . -··. 
Table 3 
Two-Factor Random Effects GLS Regression (Squared Distance) 
Number of observations 300 
n = number of groups 12 
T= number of periods 25 
R-squared overall = 0.1865 
Sq, Dist. Coefficient Std. Err. t P>ltl 
PR 112.455 51.309 2.192 0 .056 
UR 440.968 51.309 8.594 0.000 
constant 9.953 36.281 0.247 0.790 
0 ne Way Random 
Table 4 
E~ GLS R s ects egresston (Squared Distance 125 ) 
No Rebate 
Number of observations 100 
n = number of groups 4 
R-squared overall = 0.2004 
Diffl25 Coefficient Std. Err. t P>ltl 
period -8.01 1.72 -4.670 0.000 
period2 0.24 0.06 3.762 0.000 
constant 67.21 19.68 3.415 0.001 
Proportional Rebate 
Number of observations 100 
n = number of groups 4 
R-squared overall 0.2613 
Diffl25 Coefficient Std. Err. t P>ltl 
period -176.29 52.42 -3.363 0.001 
period2 4.58 1.96 2.342 0.019 
constant 2113.40 362.64 5.828 0.000 
Utilization Rebate 
Number of observations 100 
n = number of groups 4 
R -squared overall 0.0625 
Diffl25 Coefficient Std. Err. t P>ltl 
period -30.68 14.45 -2.123 0.034 
period2 1.37 0.54 2.538 O.oJI 
constant 225.25 162.96 1.382 0.117 
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Raymond Battalio, Timothy Gronberg, James Walker and panicipants at the ESA conference for 
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